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ABSTRACT  
   
I examine the degree to which stockholders’ aggregate gain/loss frame of 
reference in the equity of a given firm affects their response to the firm’s quarterly 
earnings announcements. Contrary to predictions from rational expectations 
models of trade (Shackelford and Verrecchia 2002), I find that abnormal trading 
volume around earnings announcements is larger (smaller) when stockholders are 
in an aggregate unrealized capital gain (loss) position. This relation is stronger 
among seller-initiated trades and weaker in December, consistent with the 
cognitive bias referred to as the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985). 
Sensitivity analysis reveals that the relation is stronger among less sophisticated 
investors and for firms with weaker information environments, consistent with the 
behavioral explanation.  I also present evidence on the consequences of this 
disposition effect. First, stockholders' aggregate unrealized capital gain position 
moderates the degree to which information-related determinants of trade (e.g. 
unexpected earnings, firm size, and forecast dispersion) affect abnormal 
announcement-window trading volume. Second, stockholders' aggregate 
unrealized capital gains position is associated with announcement-window 
abnormal returns, consistent with the disposition effect reducing the market's 
ability to efficiently incorporate earnings news into price. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Prior literature is mixed on the role, if any, that stockholders’ aggregate 
unrealized capital gain/loss position (hereafter, capital gains overhang) plays in 
determining their trading response to earnings announcements. Prior studies 
examining investors’ trading response to earnings announcements generally 
assume that investors make rational trading decisions with the objective of 
maximizing the present value of expected future cash flows (e.g. Holthausen and 
Verrecchia 1990; Kim and Verrecchia 1991, 1997). Accordingly, this stream of 
literature predicts that, if investors consider their capital gains when trading, it 
will be in the context of optimizing expected capital gains tax payments 
(Shackelford and Verrecchia 2002). Generally, investors who are subject to 
capital gains taxes face a lower tax rate on the sale of long-term investments 
relative to the tax rate on short-term investments. This creates incentives for 
stockholders to defer (accelerate) the sale of investments in a capital gain (loss) 
position. In contrast, cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
predicts that investors are psychologically averse to realizing losses, which 
motivates them to defer (accelerate) the sale of investments in a capital loss (gain) 
position. This psychological “disposition” to sell winners too early and hold losers 
too long, combined with self-control at year-end when faced with tax deadlines, 
has been termed the “disposition effect” (Shefrin and Statman 1985). 
While the disposition effect has been documented using individual trading 
data (e.g. Odean 1998; Locke and Mann 2005; Coval and Shumway 2005), it has 
not been shown to affect the announcement-window market reaction to earnings 
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information. Extant empirical research finds that aggregate announcement-
window abnormal trading activity varies over time with capital gains tax rates in a 
manner consistent with tax-rational behavior (Blouin et al. 2003; Hurtt and Seida 
2004). While suggestive of an aggregate tax-rational response to earnings 
announcements, this evidence does not rule out the presence of the disposition 
effect. For example, Blouin et al. (2003) note that their research design does not 
rule out behavioral effects on trading, and that the authors “look forward to 
studies that integrate the behavioral finance papers that fail to find investor-tax 
rationality, with studies, such as this one, that do find tax-rational behavior” 
(Blouin et al. 2003, p. 626). Furthermore, Frazzini (2006) examines monthly 
returns following earnings announcements and finds that post-earnings-
announcement drift is moderated by stockholders’ aggregate post-earnings 
unrealized capital gain position. He speculates that his findings are caused by 
disposition effect trading behavior around earnings announcements, but does not 
test for such announcement-window behavior. As such, the role of the disposition 
effect as a determinant of the market response to earnings announcements is an 
open question. 
I provide evidence on this question by examining the relation between 
stockholders’ capital gains overhang and both abnormal trading volume and 
returns around earnings announcements. Consistent with the disposition effect, I 
find a positive relation between stockholders’ capital gains overhang and 
abnormal announcement-window trading volume, which is stronger among seller-
initiated trades and reverses in December. While this association is significantly 
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positive in each year of my sample, I find that it varies negatively with time-series 
changes in the spread between short-term and long-term capital gains tax rates, 
consistent with the findings from prior tax research (Blouin et al. 2003, Hurtt and 
Seida 2004).  In additional analyses, I show that the disposition effect impacts the 
market response to earnings information in two ways. First, I demonstrate that 
previously identified proxies for information-related determinants of trade (e.g. 
unexpected earnings, firm size, and forecast dispersion) are more (less) likely to 
affect trading volume when stockholders are in an aggregate gain (loss) position. 
Second, I find a negative relation between stockholders’ capital gains overhang 
and abnormal announcement-window returns. This finding is consistent with the 
disposition effect causing, or at least contributing to, a short-window under-
reaction to earnings news, and is consistent with the subsequent post-earnings-
announcement drift documented in Frazzini (2006).  
These results extend our understanding of investors’ trading behavior in 
response to earnings information. Behavioral economics suggests that “behavior 
depends on how the economic actors perceive and represent the environment,” as 
well as “how they define their goals” (Simon 1997, p.  271). Consistent with this 
view, I show that the degree to which proxies for investor disagreement are 
reflected in abnormal announcement-window trading volume depends on whether 
stockholders are in a gain or loss frame of reference when earnings are 
announced. This extends prior literature that assumes that investors trade in direct 
proportion to proxies for investor disagreement (e.g. Bamber 1987; Kandel and 
Pearson 1995; Bamber et al. 1997), and motivates future research on the degree to 
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which investors’ cognitive biases affect their response to earnings information.  
My results should also be of interest to researchers who treat abnormal trading 
volume as a proxy for investor disagreement (e.g. Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006; 
Garfinkel 2009), as I show that both the level of abnormal trading volume and the 
degree to which abnormal trading volume reflects disagreement are affected by 
stockholders’ capital gains overhang.  
My findings also extend prior literature on the pricing of earnings 
information. I demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, the announcement-window 
abnormal returns to good (bad) news earnings announcements are smaller in 
magnitude when investors are in a gain (loss) position, consistent with the 
disposition effect generating, or at least contributing to, investors’ underreaction 
to earnings news. These results support Frazzini’s (2006) finding that the 
magnitude of post-earnings-announcement drift depends on stockholders’ capital 
gains overhang, and provide an alternate explanation for the positive association 
between abnormal announcement-window volume and post-earnings-
announcement drift documented in Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006).  In the context 
of the drift found by Frazzini (2006), my results suggest that a wealth transfer 
may take place around earnings announcements, from investors more prone to the 
disposition effect to those less prone to the disposition effect. That is, investors 
prone to the disposition effect sell too quickly when earnings indicate good news 
and hold stocks too long when earnings indicate bad news. This may be of interest 
to both market participants as well as regulators who are interested in leveling the 
playing field among investors.  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In chapter two, I review 
the related literature and develop predictions about the role of the disposition 
effect in the market reaction to earnings announcements. Chapter three describes 
my research design. Chapter four presents the results of my analysis. Chapter five 
presents additional robustness tests, and chapter six concludes. 
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CHAPTER II: MOTIVATION 
Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) model trading behavior around public 
disclosures in the presence of capital gains tax incentives. In the model, a public 
disclosure provides new information about the expected value of a risky asset, 
which prompts rebalancing trade from investors who are overweighted in the 
risky asset to investors who are underweighted in the risky asset, relative to the 
optimal risk-sharing equilibrium. For good news disclosures, the presence of 
capital gains tax rate differences forces overweighted stockholders to choose 
between selling their shares at the time of the disclosure and paying higher short-
term capital gains taxes on their certain profits, or retaining their shares and 
paying lower long-term capital gains taxes on uncertain profits at liquidation.  
Under these circumstances, Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) show that 
overweighted investors will sell less at the time of the disclosure than they would 
in the absence of capital gains taxes, and that, to entice sellers, buyers must 
provide compensation in the form of higher sales prices. In their empirical tests of 
these predictions, Blouin et al. (2003) develop the following formal hypothesis: 
“The incremental taxes from selling appreciated stock, which arise from the tax-
disfavored treatment accorded short-term gains as compared with long term gains, 
increase stock returns and decrease trading volume around public disclosures for 
appreciated firms” and vice-versa for depreciated stock around the disclosures of 
depreciated firms (Blouin et al. 2003, p. 615).  
While these predictions are intuitive within an expected utility framework, 
research in both experimental and archival settings has demonstrated that 
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investors often do not act in accordance with the normative predictions from 
expected utility theory. A number of studies from behavioral finance document 
that individuals exhibit a tendency to “sell winners and ride losers”, except in 
December, and this tendency has been termed the “disposition effect” (Shefrin 
and Statman 1985).1 Except in December, this behavior runs counter to the tax-
rational behavior predicted by Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) and Blouin et 
al. (2003).   
Shefrin and Statman (1985) introduce a four-element theoretical 
framework to motivate the disposition effect. The first two elements of the 
framework are prospect theory and mental accounting (hereafter, PT-MA).  
Prospect theory suggests that investors possess an S-shaped value function that is 
concave (risk-averse) over gains and convex (risk-loving) over losses (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Mental accounting is invoked to suggest that the relevant 
reference point for determining a gain or loss for a particular stock transaction is 
the investor’s cost basis in that individual stock (e.g. Thaler 1985). The third 
element describes investors’ emotional motivation to seek the pride associated 
with recognizing gains and to avoid the regret associated with realizing losses. 
The final element relates to investors’ self-control. Shefrin and Statman (1985) 
state: 
We conjecture that tax planning in general, and loss realization in 
particular, is disagreeable and requires self-control. Should this be the 
                                                 
1
 The disposition effect has been documented in the portfolios of individual stock investors (Odean 
1998; Shapira and Venezia 2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001), professional futures traders 
(Locke and Mann 2005; Coval and Shumway 2005), as well as individual home owners 
(Genesove and Mayer 2001). See Kaustia (2010) for a review of the literature. 
8 
case, then it is reasonable to expect that self-motivation is easier in 
December than other months because of its perceived deadline 
characteristic. Thus, a concentration of loss realizations in December is 
consistent with our behavioral framework, but inconsistent with [that of a] 
rational individual. (Shefrin and Statman 1985, p. 785) 
 
Thus, the disposition effect describes a general tendency to sell winners and ride 
losers as well as a seasonal pattern of increased loss realization in December. 
Because tax motivations and the disposition effect offer conflicting 
predictions about the effect of stockholders’ capital gains overhang on their 
trading behavior, it is unclear which type of behavior is expected to dominate 
around earnings announcements.  Existing empirical evidence is both indirect and 
mixed. Blouin et al. (2003) find that investors trade appreciated (depreciated) 
stock less (more) around earnings announcements in years when there are greater 
tax penalties (benefits) on the sale of appreciated (depreciated) stock. They 
interpret this conditional time-series variation as being consistent with investors 
exhibiting tax-rational behavior. However, the sale of appreciated stock is tax-
disfavored in every year of their sample period. Therefore, truly tax-rational 
behavior would suggest an unconditional negative relation between trading 
volume and stockholders’ capital gains overhang around earnings announcements, 
which Blouin et al. (2003) do not address. In other words, investors might exhibit 
overall tax-irrational behavior (i.e. the disposition effect) in every year of the 
sample period, while at the same time behaving somewhat less irrationally in 
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years when the tax penalties of irrational behavior are stronger. Such behavior 
would be consistent with Shefrin and Statman’s (1985) conjecture that investors 
exhibit self-control over their irrational disposition preferences when the tax 
consequences of their behavior are more salient.  
Evidence in favor of the disposition effect impacting investors’ response 
to earnings announcements is also indirect. Frazzini (2006) examines the monthly 
abnormal returns to a trading strategy where portfolios are sorted on recent 
earnings news and stockholders’ capital gains overhang. Frazzini’s (2006) 
predictions, based on the disposition effect, are essentially the opposite of the 
predictions in Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002). For example, around good 
news announcements, Frazzini (2006) predicts that active selling by disposition 
prone stockholders creates excess supply, which leads to a lower price impact, 
and thus generates underreaction to good news. He also makes complimentary 
predictions for bad news announcements.  
In testing these predictions, Frazzini (2006) does not examine the 
announcement-window market reaction to earnings news, nor does his study 
incorporate the tax-rational predictions and findings in Shackelford and 
Verrecchia (2002) and Blouin et al. (2003). Thus, while Frazzini (2006) finds 
evidence that monthly post-event drift is larger when earnings news and capital 
gains have the same sign, his results do not rule-out alternate explanations or the 
tax-rational behavior predicted in the accounting literature. For example, Grinblatt 
and Han (2005) find a general relation between the disposition effect and price 
momentum. Accordingly, Frazzini’s (2006) earnings news proxy may capture a 
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general news effect that is not related to the announcement-window market 
reaction to earnings news.  
Given the conflicting predictions and ambiguous results from prior 
literature, the relation between stockholders’ capital gains overhang and their 
trading behavior around earnings announcements is an open question. Because the 
individual accounts of many types of investors (both sophisticated and 
unsophisticated) have exhibited evidence of the disposition effect, and the results 
in Blouin et al. (2003) do not rule out such behavior, I predict that I will observe 
evidence of the disposition effect in the aggregate market response around 
earnings announcements. To the extent that aggregate investor behavior is 
consistent with the disposition effect, it suggests the following hypotheses.  
First, if some investors are prone to the disposition effect, it should be 
reflected in abnormal announcement-window trading volume. This leads to my 
first hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relation between stockholders’ capital gains overhang and 
abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements. 
 
Additionally, while trading volume measures the behavior of both buyers and 
sellers around earnings announcements, only sellers are directly affected by the 
capital gains overhang.2  This leads to: 
                                                 
2
 Buyers are indirectly affected through any seller-induced price pressure.  
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H1a: There is a stronger positive relation between stockholders’ capital gains 
overhang and abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements 
for seller-initiated trades than buyer-initiated trades. 
According to Shefrin and Statman’s (1985) theoretical framework, investors are 
less reluctant to realize losses in December, when faced with salient year-end tax 
deadlines. Thus, I also predict: 
H1b: The positive relation between stockholders’ capital gains overhang and 
abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements is weaker in 
December than other months of the year.  
 
I also examine two additional aspects of the market response to earnings 
information. First, prior literature predicts and finds that earnings information will 
generate trading volume to the extent that earnings information either resolves 
differences in predisclosure information asymmetry or generates differential 
interpretations about the firm’s future prospects (Bamber et al. 2011). Prior 
literature develops proxies for the magnitude of these types of information-related 
disagreement, and tests for a direct relation between the level of disagreement and 
abnormal announcement-window trading volume. However, for any given level 
of information-related disagreement, investors subject to the disposition effect 
may be more (less) likely to trade on this disagreement when they perceive 
themselves to be in a gain (loss) frame of reference. If enough investors exhibit 
announcement-window disposition effect behavior, it will affect the degree to 
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which aggregate trading volume reflects disagreement. Thus, I examine the 
following hypothesis: 
H2:  Information-related disagreement will generate more announcement-window 
abnormal trading volume when stockholders are in a gain position than 
when stockholders are in a loss position at the time of the earnings 
announcement.  
Finally, both tax-rational behavior and the disposition effect predict that 
any changes in the relative supply of equity generated by sellers’ capital gains 
will result in price pressure. In the case of the disposition effect, sellers in a gain 
position will be willing to accept a price discount for the opportunity to lock in 
their certain gains, and sellers in a loss position will demand a price premium to 
compensate for the regret associated with realizing a loss. This hypothesized price 
effect is a key component of Frazzini’s (2006) motivation for examining the 
relation between the disposition effect and post-earnings-announcement drift, and 
is contrary to Blouin et al.’s (2003) interpretation of their pricing results. Thus, I 
examine the following hypothesis for evidence of investors’ disposition effect 
behavior impacting the aggregate price response to earnings announcements: 
H3: Abnormal announcement-window returns will be more negative when 
investors are in a gain position than when investors are in a loss position at 
the time of the earnings announcement. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
Variable Measurement 
The Capital Gains Overhang  
To test hypotheses related to the disposition effect, I construct a measure 
of investors’ aggregate unrealized capital gain or loss position in a given stock. 
This requires an assumption about stockholders’ aggregate reference price (“cost 
basis”) at any given point in time. Following Frazzini (2006), I use the time series 
of net purchases by 13-F institutional investors to compute the firm-level 
weighted average reference price on a given date. Specifically, the reference price 
(RP) is calculated as 
 
1
,
0
t
t t t n t n
n
RP V Pφ −
− −
=
= ∑                                                (1) 
where  Vt,t-n is the number of shares purchased at date t-n that are still held by the 
original purchasers at date t, φ is a normalizing constant such that ,0
t
t t nn
Vφ
−
=
=∑
, and Pt is the stock price at the end of month t. When a stock is purchased several 
times, and partially sold at different dates, it is assumed that investors use the 
purchase price of the shares sold as the basis for computing capital gains and 
losses. To maintain consistency with Frazzini (2006), I assume that investors use 
a first-in, first-out (FIFO) mental accounting method to associate shares sold with 
their cost basis.3 Given this estimated average reference price, investors’ 
                                                 
3
 Frazzini (2006) notes that his results are robust to alternately using LIFO, HIFO, the last trading 
price, the last buying price, or averages of past buying and selling prices when constructing the 
reference price. Based on his analysis, along with the volume-based sensitivity analysis I perform 
in chapter five, I believe that my results would also remain robust to alternate inventory cost basis 
assumptions.  
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estimated average unrealized capital gain/loss position in a given stock, referred 
to as the capital gains overhang (CGO),  can be defined for firm i at any given 
time t as  
 
it it
it
it
P RPCGO
P
−
=
                                             (2) 
The following example illustrates how investors’ net purchases and the 
FIFO assumption are used to compute the reference price and capital gains 
overhang: Assume that an investor purchases 100 shares of a stock at date 0 for P0 
= $10, 150 shares at date 1 for P1 = $8, and an additional 50 shares at date 2 for 
P2 = $11, and subsequently sells 200 shares at date 3. The investor’s “mental 
book” at the end of period 3 will be given by V3,0 = 0, V3,1=50, and V3,2 = 50. 
Assuming this investor were the only investor in the stock and that P3 = $13, the 
weighted average reference price at date 3 (RP3) will be (50*$8 + 50*$11)/100 = 
$9.50 and the capital gains overhang (CGO3) will be ($13 - $9.50)/$13 ≈ 26.9% 
CGOit is intended to represent the best estimate of a stock’s deviation from 
its cost basis for the representative investor. The ideal measure of CGOit would 
incorporate the holdings data of all shareholders at time t, as opposed to 
estimating a proxy using the observed quarterly holdings of 13-F institutions. 
While it is not possible to obtain holdings data for all shareholders, Frazzini 
(2006) repeats his analysis on a subsample for which he is able to combine retail 
investor data from a discount brokerage with his institutional data, and does not 
find a noticeable difference in results using the combined reference price. 
Furthermore, in chapter five I perform sensitivity analysis using an alternate 
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volume-based measure of CGOit similar to that employed by Grinblatt and Han 
(2005), incorporating the historical trading volume of all shareholders, and find 
that all inferences from the results presented in the paper remain unchanged.  
 For ease of interpretation, in the majority of my analyses I employ a 
binary measure of investors’ unrealized gain/loss position, CGO_DUMMYit, 
which is equal to 1 when CGOit > 0 and zero otherwise.4 This allows readers to 
interpret the coefficients on interacted terms, and also corresponds to the simple 
description of the disposition effect as a “disposition to sell winners and ride 
losers” (Shefrin and Statman 1985).  In untabulated analysis, results are stronger 
using the continuous CGOit measure, consistent with the reported results 
representing a conservative estimate of the impact of the disposition effect on 
aggregate investor behavior. 
 
Abnormal Trading Volume 
 
I employ a transaction-based measure of abnormal trading volume to 
examine investor trading behavior around earnings announcements.  Specifically, 
I estimate abnormal three-day volume, AVOLijt as 
 
Number of firm  trades by investor group  during 
three-day earnings announcement interval ln( )
Median number of firm  trades by investor group  
during three-day non-announcement intervals
ijt
i j
tAVOL
i j=
 
                                                 
4
 This coding includes four firm-quarter observations for which CGO=0 in the unrealized loss 
sample. Results are identical if these very few observations are instead deleted or included in the 
gain sample.  
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where the three-day earnings announcement interval is measured from days         
[-1,+1] relative to Compustat quarterly earnings announcement date t , and the 
non-announcement period includes all contiguous three-day periods from trading 
days [-250, -2] relative to the earnings announcement date, excluding any three-
day periods containing previous earnings announcements.  In primary analyses I 
examine all trades, denoted AVOLTOTAL TRADES, but I also separately calculate 
additional measures of AVOLijt for buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades in 
order to test H1a.5 For comparison with prior literature, I also compute a measure 
of abnormal trading volume based on daily CRSP share turnover. Definitions of 
these alternate abnormal volume measures are provided in Appendix A. 
I use a transaction-based measure because the disposition effect is generally 
motivated and examined with respect to each investor’s decision of whether or not 
to engage in trade (e.g. Odean 1998), as opposed to the magnitude of shares 
traded. Also, Cready and Ramanan (1995) perform simulation analysis on market 
data to examine differences in transaction-based versus volume-based measures 
of abnormal trading activity, and find that transaction-based research designs are 
more powerful in detecting changes in trading activity than volume-based 
designs. 
  As my research question examines the incremental role of the disposition 
effect in explaining announcement-induced trading, I scale the number of 
announcement-window trades by median non-announcement trading, using the 
most common non-announcement window found in prior literature examining 
                                                 
5Trades are classified as buyer or seller-initiated using the Lee-Ready (1991) algorithm. 
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abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements (e.g. Bamber 1986, 
1987; Atiase and Bamber 1994; Bamber et al. 1997; Ahmed et al. 2003; Barron et 
al. 2011). I examine the natural log of this ratio to mitigate the impact of 
skewness in the distribution of trading volume. 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
To test H3, I examine the three-day [-1,+1] announcement-window 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) relative to the Fama-French-momentum four-
factor benchmark model (Carhart 1997). Using a four-factor benchmark controls 
for standard risk factors, including momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). 
Controlling for momentum in the benchmark return also controls for any 
mechanical correlation between momentum and my measure of CGO.  
 
Tests of the Disposition Effect in Abnormal Trading Volume Around 
Earnings Announcements 
 
H1 predicts that, ceteris paribus, there will be a positive relation between 
investors’ unrealized capital gains and abnormal trading volume around earnings 
announcements. To test for this relation, controlling for previously identified 
determinants of abnormal trading around earnings announcements, I estimate the 
following OLS model: 
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where AVOLijt is abnormal trading volume as defined earlier in this chapter, and 
CGO_DUMMYit is a binary measure equal to one when CGOit is greater than 
zero, and zero otherwise.  If H1 is supported, I predict a positive coefficient on 
CGO_DUMMYit (α1 > 0). I include a number of control variables identified in 
prior literature as associated with either abnormal trading volume around earnings 
announcements or my measure of the capital gains overhang.  
Prior literature predicts that earnings announcements generate trading 
volume to the extent that earnings information resolves differences in 
predisclosure information or generates differential interpretations about the firm’s 
future prospects (Bamber et al. 2011).  Thus, I include three controls which proxy 
for these information-related determinants of announcement-window trading 
volume. Bamber (1986, 1987) identifies the absolute value of unexpected 
earnings as a proxy for differential beliefs created by the earnings announcement, 
stating that “both capital markets research and human information processing 
research suggest that, on average, the more informative a disclosure, the greater 
the subsequent dispersion of beliefs” (Bamber 1987, p. 512). Therefore, I predict 
a positive coefficient on ABS_UEit, defined as one hundred times the absolute 
value of I/B/E/S actual EPS for quarter t minus the most recent mean I/B/E/S 
consensus quarter t EPS forecast prior to the earnings announcement, scaled by 
beginning of quarter t stock price in Compustat. Bamber (1986, 1987) also 
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predicts and finds that, because there is less pre-announcement information 
available for smaller firms, earnings announcements will generate more belief 
revision and spur heavier trading volume for small firms compared to large firms. 
Thus, I predict a negative coefficient on SIZE, calculated as the natural log of 
market value of equity at the beginning of quarter t. Previous literature also 
examines pre-announcement dispersion in analyst forecasts as a measure of 
predisclosure information uncertainty (e.g. Bamber et al. 1997). Consistent with 
earnings announcements generating greater abnormal trading volume when there 
is greater predisclosure information uncertainty, I predict a positive coefficient on 
DISPERSION, the natural log of preannouncement forecast dispersion, measured 
as the standard deviation of the most recent I/B/E/S consensus EPS forecast for 
quarter t prior to the earnings announcement scaled by beginning of quarter t 
stock price in Compustat. 
I also include five additional control variables. ABS_RETURNit, the 
absolute value of firm i’s cumulative return for the three-day window centered on 
earnings announcement date t controls for the positive contemporaneous 
association between price and volume (Karpoff 1987).  I control for the effect of 
market-wide trading by including MKT_TURNit, the natural log of the percentage 
of all NYSE/AMEX firms’ outstanding shares that are traded over the three-day 
event window (e.g. Bamber et al. 1997). I also include PRICEit, the natural log of 
closing price at the beginning of quarter t as an inverse proxy for commission and 
structural bid/ask spread transaction costs (Utama and Cready 1997). Finally, I 
include AVG_TURNit, the average monthly share turnover for firm i over the prior 
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twelve months, and MOMENTUMit, the 11-month buy-and-hold return for firm i 
beginning twelve months prior to the month of the earnings announcement, to 
control for any mechanical correlation between these variables and my measure of 
CGOit (Grinblatt and Han 2005; Frazzini 2006). Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) 
also document a positive association between abnormal earnings announcement 
trading volume and AVG_TURNit, supporting its inclusion in the model.   
Hypotheses H1a and H1b predict that the positive relation between the 
capital gains overhang and abnormal announcement-window trading volume will 
be stronger for seller initiated trades and weaker in December. In support of H1a, 
I predict that the coefficient on CGO_DUMMY in equation (3) will be larger 
when the dependent measure is AVOLSELLER-INITIATED TRADES than when the 
dependent measure is AVOLBUYER-INITIATED TRADES.  To test H1b, I estimate the 
following OLS model: 
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         (4) 
where DECEMBER is a binary variable equal to 1 for earnings announcements 
that occur during the month of December, and zero otherwise. If H1b is 
supported, I predict a negative coefficient on CGOit*DECEMBERit (α3 < 0). In 
addition to including DECEMBER in the model, there are three other differences 
between equation (3) and equation (4). First, because the December reversal of 
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the disposition effect is motivated by tax-loss selling, the magnitude of the capital 
gains overhang is relevant when examining H1b, and the December reversal may 
be more pronounced for depreciated than appreciated stocks. Thus, I include 
CGO, instead of CGO_DUMMY, as the variable of interest in the model, and 
examine equation (4) on subsamples of appreciated and depreciated stocks, in 
addition to the full sample. Also, because few earnings announcements occur 
during December, the analyst following requirement for computing ABS_UE and 
DISPERSION overly limits the incidence of December earnings announcements 
in the sample. Thus, when estimating equation (4), I relax the analyst following 
requirement by dropping DISPERSION from the model. I also replace the analyst-
based ABS_UE with a seasonal random-walk measure of earnings surprise, 
ABS_SUE, measured as abs(EARNINGSt – EARNINGSt-4) scaled by the standard 
deviation of EARNINGS over the previous twenty quarters (minimum of eight 
quarters of data required), where EARNINGS is income before extraordinary 
items scaled by beginning-of-quarter total assets.  All other variables in equation 
(4) are as defined in equation (3).  
 Hypothesis H2 also examines the relation between the capital gains 
overhang and abnormal announcement-window trading volume. Hypothesis H2 
predicts that investors’ capital gains position will affect the degree to which 
information-related belief revision around earnings announcements generates 
trade. Accordingly, to test H2 I re-estimate equation (3) including interactions 
between CGO_DUMMY and the three information-related determinants of 
abnormal trading volume included in the model: 
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        (5) 
where all variables are as defined in equation (3) above. H2 predicts that, to the 
extent that the information-related proxies are expected to generate trade, they 
will generate more trade when investors are in an unrealized gain position. Thus, I 
predict positive coefficients on the interactive terms CGO_DUMMYit*ABS_UEit 
(α3>0) and CGO_DUMMYit*DISPERSIONit (α7 > 0), and a negative coefficient on 
the interactive term CGO_DUMMYit*SIZEit (α5 < 0). 
 
Tests of the Disposition Effect in Abnormal Returns Around Earnings 
Announcements 
 
H3 predicts that, ceteris paribus, there will be a negative relation between 
investors’ unrealized capital gains and abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements. To test for this relation, controlling for previously identified 
determinants of abnormal returns around earnings announcements, I estimate the 
following OLS model:        
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(6) 
where CAR(-1,+1) is firm i’s three-day cumulative abnormal return  around earnings 
announcement date t, relative to the Fama-French-momentum four-factor 
benchmark return (Carhart 1997), and CGO_DUMMYit is as previously defined.  
If H3 is supported, I predict a negative coefficient on CGO_DUMMYit (β1 < 0). 
While CAR(-1,+1) is adjusted for common risk factors (i.e. beta, firm size, 
book-to-market, momentum), I also control for a number of previously identified 
determinants of abnormal returns around earnings announcements. I predict a 
positive coefficient on UE, the signed equivalent of ABS_UE defined above, to 
control for the well-documented earnings-return relation. I also allow for a non-
linear earnings return-relation (Freeman and Tse 1992) by including 
NONLINEAR, defined as UE*ABS_UE. I allow for abnormal returns to differ 
around quarterly loss announcements (e.g. Hayn 1995) by including a LOSS 
indicator, equal to 1 when reported quarterly income before extraordinary items is 
negative, and zero otherwise.   
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Recent studies have also identified an earnings level effect as a 
determinant of abnormal returns around earnings announcements, distinct from 
the effect of unexpected earnings (e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2011). 
Thus, I include ROA, defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by 
beginning-of-quarter total assets. Finally, I include three variables from the 
abnormal volume model that may also impact abnormal returns, DISPERSION, 
PRICE, and AVG_TURN, as defined in equation (4).6  
                                                 
6
 Barron et al. (2009) identify a negative relation between forecast dispersion and returns, and 
Bhushan (1994) finds that price and average turnover exhibit inverse relations with the return 
reaction to earnings announcements. 
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CHAPTER IV: DATA AND RESULTS 
Sample Selection 
 My study incorporates data from a number of different sources. 
Accounting data is obtained from Compustat, daily stock price and share volume 
data is from CRSP, and analyst forecast data is from the monthly I/B/E/S 
summary file. My study also incorporates stock quotes and detailed trade data 
from the NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, as well as 13-F institutional 
holdings data from the Thompson Reuters CDA/Spectrum database.  Following 
prior literature (Lee 1992, Bhattacharya 2001), my study includes TAQ trades 
with a condition code of "regular sale" between 9:30 AM and 4:15 PM EST, 
excluding each day's opening trade. 
The Thompson Reuters 13-F database (also referred to as S34) used to 
compute CGOit contains holdings information for all registered institutional 
investment managers who file form 13-F with the SEC. Any investment entity 
with over $100 million under its control is required to file form 13-F, and smaller 
entities who choose to report their holdings are also included in the database. 
Small holdings of less than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in a single asset are not 
required to be reported and therefore may be omitted from the holdings data if not 
voluntarily disclosed by the institution.  Form 13-F is required to be filed 
quarterly with the SEC.  Following Frazzini (2006), the stock price at the 
quarterly report date is used as a proxy for each institution’s buying or selling 
price each quarter. Clearly, an institution’s actual transaction price is generally 
different from the price at the report date. To the extent that stock prices follow a 
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random walk after a purchase or sale, any measurement error due to this data 
limitation should generate noise in CGOit but not bias the results in any particular 
direction (Frazzini 2006, p. 2024 – 2025).  
Using these data, I examine a sample of quarterly earnings announcements 
of NYSE/AMEX listed firms for the years 1994, the first year for which TAQ 
data is available during the [-250, -2] day window prior to the earnings 
announcement, through 2007.  I obtain earnings announcement dates from the 
Compustat quarterly file, and require each firm-quarter observation in the primary 
sample to have sufficient data to calculate AVOLTOTAL TRADES, CGOit, and the 
control variables defined in equation (3), resulting in a sample size of 55,245 
firm-quarter observations for 2,430 unique firms. Table 1 summarizes the sample 
selection procedures. Other than the elimination of NASDAQ firms, which is 
common in studies examining trading volume (Statman et al. 2006), the most 
restrictive sample selection requirements in my study are the need for sufficient 
13-F data to compute CGOit and a minimum of three analysts following the firm 
in order to calculate DISPERSION.  In chapter five, I perform sensitivity analysis 
relaxing each of these requirements in order to confirm that my results can be 
generalized to firms without available 13-F data or analyst coverage. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the impact of 
outliers.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in 
equation (3), both for the full sample (N=55,245), and separately for the 
unrealized gain (N=15,830) and loss (N=39,415) samples. Note that many of the 
variables have been log transformed, including the measures of AVOLijt, 
Therefore, when interpreting the mean sample values of AVOLijt, one must 
remember that the log transformation will understate the percentage increase in 
trading activity during the announcement-window. For example, after 
exponentiation, the mean value of AVOLTOTAL TRADES (0.448) in the sample 
represents an increase in total trades of roughly 56.5% during the announcement 
window, relative to the median number of three-day non-announcement trades. 
Table 2 reports similar mean increases in abnormal trading volume around 
earnings announcements across all measures of AVOLijt, consistent with prior 
literature examining abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
CGO is negatively skewed, which is to be expected given that the measure 
is bounded above at 1, but unbounded at the bottom of the distribution. The 
untabulated time-series distribution of CGO compares reasonably to the values 
presented in Fig. 2 of Grinblatt and Han (2005).  Other independent variables also 
exhibit distributions in line with expectations.   The means of all of the variables 
presented in Table 2 are significantly different across unrealized gain and loss 
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observations (p < 0.01). Consistent with H1, AVOLijt is significantly higher for 
unrealized gain observations than unrealized loss observations for all four 
measures presented. Consistent with H1a, the difference in mean abnormal 
volume is larger for AVOLSELLER-INITIATED TRADES than AVOLBUYER-INITIATED TRADES.  
Significant differences across the control variables presented in Table 2 support 
their inclusion in the multivariate analysis.  Confirming the univariate results 
presented in Table 2, Figure 1 displays the differences in mean AVOLTOTAL TRADES 
and AVOLSELLER-INITIATED TRADES between unrealized gain and unrealized loss 
observations for each year in the sample.  Consistent with H1 and H1a the 
differences are positive and significant (p < 0.01) for each year in the sample 
period, and consistently larger for AVOLSELLER-INITIATED TRADES.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Table 3 presents pearson correlations among the variables included in 
equation (3). All of the correlations presented in Table 3 are statistically 
significant (p < 0.01), except for those between SIZE and both AVOLTOTAL TRADES 
and AVOLBUYER-INITIATED TRADES and between ABS_UE and  
AVOLBUYER-INITIATED TRADES. There are fairly high correlations among the various 
measures of AVOL (ranging from 0.732 to 0.951), which is to be expected. 
Consistent with H1 and H1a, CGO is positively correlated with all measures of 
AVOL, and the largest correlation is with AVOLSELLER-INITIATED TRADES (0.098). Of 
the control variables, ABS_RETURN is the most highly correlated with the 
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measures of AVOL, which is consistent with the well-documented 
contemporaneous relation between price changes and volume (Karpoff 1987). 
CGO is also noticeably correlated with a number of the control variables, 
indicating that multivariate analysis will be helpful in determining the conditional 
relation between CGO and AVOL.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Multivariate Evidence of a Disposition Effect in The Abnormal Trading 
Volume Around Earnings Announcements 
 
Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions of Equation (3). Each 
column in Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (3) using a different 
specification of AVOLijt as the dependent measure.  T-statistics reported in 
parenthesis are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by 
firm and calendar quarter (Petersen 2009).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
As predicted, the coefficients on CGO_DUMMY are positive and 
significant (p < 0.01) across all specifications of AVOL, consistent with the 
presence of a disposition effect in abnormal announcement-window trading 
volume. The first column reports the results of estimating equation (4) with 
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AVOLTOTAL TRADES as the dependent measure. As shown in the first column, the 
coefficient of 0.068 on CGO_DUMMY indicates that, ceteris paribus, the 
exponentiated level of AVOLTOTAL TRADES is approximately 7.0% higher around 
earnings announcements when shareholders are in an aggregate unrealized gain 
versus unrealized loss position at the time of the earnings announcement. In order 
to interpret the economic significance of this difference in trading activity, recall 
that the mean value of AVOLTOTAL TRADES (.448) in the sample represents an 
increase in total trades of roughly 56.5% during the announcement window, 
relative to the median number of three-day non-announcement trades. Evaluated 
at this mean level, the marginal effect of stockholders being in an aggregate 
unrealized gain instead of unrealized loss position at the time of the 
announcement leads to an additional 11.0% of abnormal announcement-window 
trades.  For comparison, the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase 
in ABS_UE evaluated at the sample mean only leads to an additional 1.5% of 
abnormal announcement-window trades.  
For consistency with prior literature, which has examined abnormal 
trading volume around earnings announcements using security-level share 
turnover data from CRSP, I examine AVOLSHARE TURNOVER in column two, and find 
that inferences remain unchanged. Columns 3 and 4 examine the presence of the 
disposition effect among buyer- and seller-initiated trades. Consistent with  H1a, 
untabulated Wald tests from multivariate multiple regressions confirm that the 
coefficient on CGO_DUMMY is significantly larger (p < 0.01) when equation (4)  
is estimated using AVOLSELLER-INITIATED TRADES than when using AVOLBUYER-
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INITIATED TRADES as the dependent measure.  The control variables included in 
equation 4 are significant as predicted with the exception of AVG_TURN, which 
is insignificant in some specifications, and DISPERSION which is negative and 
significant in column 2, contrary to the predicted positive relation, and 
insignificant in all other specifications.7  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions of equation (4), which is 
the model used to test for the December seasonality in the disposition effect 
predicted by H1b. The dependent measure in equation (4) is AVOLTOTAL TRADES. As 
in Table 4, t-statistics reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-way 
clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and year. In Column 1, I estimate 
equation (4) for the full sample. Consistent with H1b, there is a negative and 
significant (p < 0.01) coefficient on CGO*DECEMBER. The coefficient on 
CGO*DECEMBER is -0.079, while the coefficient on CGO is 0.069. A Wald test 
indicates that the sum of the coefficients is not significantly different from zero, 
consistent with the disposition effect being eliminated during the month of 
December.   In columns 2 and 3, I examine the December effect separately for 
unrealized gain (CGO > 0) and unrealized loss (CGO < 0) observations, 
respectively. I find a December effect for both the unrealized gain and unrealized 
                                                 
7
 Untabulated analysis indicates that the relation between DISPERSION and abnormal trading 
volume is sensitive to the sample period and measure of abnormal trading volume used in 
estimation, indicating that this unexpected result may be due to differences in my sample period 
and research design compared with those in prior literature 
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loss samples. While the December effect is generally thought to relate to tax-loss 
selling, my results may be consistent with taxpayers also deferring the sale of 
gains in December, in order to defer the cash payment of capital gains taxes. 
However, comparison of the December effect between the unrealized gain and 
loss subsamples in my study should be interpreted with caution, as there are 
relatively few December earnings announcements in each subsample.8 The 
majority of the control variables are significant in the predicted direction, and the 
few that are not remain insignificantly different from zero.  
In untabulated analysis, I also replicate the tests in Blouin et al. (2003) for 
my sample period and variable definitions. Consistent with Blouin et al. (2003), I 
find evidence of a negative interaction between CGO and the spread between 
short-term and long-term enacted capital gains rates, as well as a negative 
interaction between CGO and an indicator variable for earnings announcements 
which occur when the long-term capital gains rate is relatively high compared to 
historical levels.9  While these results confirm that capital gains tax incentives 
mitigate the disposition effect, the overall set of results presented in the paper 
suggest that, except in December, tax incentives do no overwhelm the disposition 
                                                 
8
 There are 1,767 December earnings announcements (1.97% of the total sample) in the Table 5 
sample. Of these 1,767 December announcements, 748 (1,019) are included in the unrealized loss 
(gain) subsample, representing 2.29% (1.79%) of the total unrealized loss (gain) subsample. In 
both subsamples, December earnings announcements are roughly evenly distributed with respect 
to which of the firm’s fiscal quarters (one through four) the announced earnings relate to.  
9
 I also repeat the analyses in my study and the replication of Blouin et al. (2003) using a measure 
of CGO based on a reference price which only includes purchases within one year prior to the 
earnings announcement date, in order to align the capital gains proxy with the short-term capital 
gains tax holding period during my sample. While weaker in magnitude, all qualitative inferences 
from my analyses as well as the Blouin et al. (2003) replication remain unchanged. 
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effect as a determinant of abnormal trading volume around earnings 
announcements.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Moving on to tests of the impact of the disposition effect on the market 
response to earnings information, Table 6 presents the results of OLS regressions 
of equation (5). As in Table 5, the dependent measure in equation (5) is 
AVOLTOTAL TRADES and t-statistics reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-
way clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and year. Table 6 provides 
evidence on the extent to which the coefficients on ABS_UE, SIZE, and 
DISPERSION vary with stockholders’ capital gains overhang. Columns 1, 2, and 
3 examine separate interactions between CGO_DUMMY and ABS_UE, SIZE, and 
DISPERSION, respectively.  The coefficients on each interaction term are in the  
predicted direction, with varied levels of statistical significance (the coefficients 
on the interaction terms for ABS_UE, SIZE, and DISPERSION are significant at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively). This suggests that these proxies for 
earnings-related disagreement are stronger determinants of trading behavior when 
stockholders are in a capital gain position than when stockholders are in a capital 
loss position and reluctant to trade, even in the presence of earnings-related 
disagreement.   
For example, in column 1, the coefficient on CGO_DUMMY*ABS_UE is 
0.024, while the coefficient on ABS_UE is 0.004. Evaluated at the sample mean of 
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AVOLTOTAL TRADES, these coefficients suggest that, ceteris paribus, a one standard 
deviation increase in ABS_UE would generate an additional 4.9% in 
announcement-window total trades over the median level of non-announcement 
total trades for firms whose stockholders are in an aggregate unrealized gain 
position when earnings are announced, but only an additional 0.8% increase in 
announcement-window total trades when stockholders are in an aggregate 
unrealized loss position.  
 In column 3, the coefficient on DISPERSION is -0.012 (p < 0.05), while 
the coefficient on CGO_DUMMY*DISPERSION is 0.010 (p < 0.10), indicating 
that the unexpected negative coefficient on DISPERSION observed in Table 4 
may only hold for firms whose stockholders are in an unrealized loss position. 
However, in column 4, which presents the results of estimating equation (5) 
including all three interaction terms, the coefficients on both DISPERSION and 
CGO_DUMMY*DISPERSION become insignificantly different from zero.  In 
contrast, the coefficients on the interaction terms for both ABS_UE and SIZE 
remain statistically significant and relatively stable in magnitude when all 
interactions are included together in the model. Given the unexpected direction 
and the sensitivity of the observed coefficients on DISPERSION throughout my 
analyses, further research on DISPERSION as a proxy for earnings-related 
disagreement and its relation with abnormal trading volume may be called for.   
 
Evidence of the Disposition Effect in the Abnormal Returns Around 
Earnings Announcements 
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H3 predicts abnormal announcement-window returns will be more 
negative around earnings announcements when stockholders are in an aggregate 
unrealized gain versus loss position.  Figure 2 presents univariate evidence on this 
hypothesis by illustrating the mean three-day cumulative abnormal returns around 
unrealized gain and loss observations, for each decile of unexpected earnings. 
Consistent with H3, the mean CAR is more negative for unrealized gain 
observations than unrealized loss observations over all deciles of unexpected 
earnings.  Untabulated Satterthwaite t-statistics indicate that the differences in 
mean CAR are statistically significant at the 0.01 (0.05) level for six (seven) out of 
ten deciles of unexpected earnings. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
To provide multivariate evidence on H3, Table 7 presents the results of 
OLS regressions of equation (6).  The dependent measure in equation (6) is    
CAR(-1,+1), and H3 predicts a negative coefficient on CGO_DUMMY. As in 
previous tables, t-statistics reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-way 
clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and year. Column 1 presents the 
results of estimating equation (7) on the full sample. Consistent with H3, the 
coefficient of -0.007 on CGO_DUMMY indicates that, ceteris paribus, abnormal 
returns are 0.7% lower around earnings announcements where stockholders are in 
an unrealized gain position relative to earnings announcements where 
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stockholders are in an unrealized loss position. Control variables in column 1 are 
significant as predicted with the exception of AVG_TURN, PRICE and 
DISPERSION, which are statistically insignificant.  
Frazzini (2006) finds that the disposition effect impacts the pricing of both 
good and bad news. Furthermore, a negative coefficient on CGO_DUMMY for 
good news announcements indicates that unrealized gains dampen the 
announcement-window reaction to good news, while a negative coefficient on 
CGO_DUMMY for bad news announcements indicates that unrealized gains 
magnify the reaction to bad news. Thus, to confirm that my results are not 
confined to one type of earnings news, columns 2 and 3 separately estimate 
equation (7) on good (UE > 0) and bad (UE < 0) news announcements, 
respectively.  I find that the coefficient on CGO_DUMMY is negative (p < 0.01) 
for both good and bad news announcements, which is consistent with Frazzini’s 
(2006) prediction that the disposition effect causes the market to underreact to 
earnings news when news and capital gains have the same sign. In the case of 
good news announcements, the incremental negative three-day abnormal return 
associated with being in an aggregate unrealized gain position is an economically 
meaningful -1.2%. 
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CHAPTER V: ROBUSTNESS 
 
In addition to the analysis presented in chapter four, I perform several tests 
to examine whether my findings are sensitive to my research design choices. 
When relevant, untabulated sensitivity tests have been discussed throughout the 
text. In this chapter, I tabulate and present the results of two additional sets of 
sensitivity analysis. 
One aspect of my research design which may limit the generalizability of 
my results is my sample selection procedure. In order to control for differential 
predisclosure earnings expectations as a determinant of the market reaction to 
earnings announcements, I require each firm-quarter observation in my sample to 
have available quarterly earnings forecasts from a minimum of three different 
analysts. Since many publicly traded firms are not followed by three or more 
analysts (as reported by I/B/E/S) each quarter, I examine whether the inferences 
drawn from my study may be generalized to firms without high levels of analyst 
coverage. Investor trading behavior may differ for these firms, because prior 
literature demonstrates that investors in firms with low or no analyst coverage 
must make trading decisions in a relatively impoverished information 
environment relative to the information environment faced by investors in firms 
with high levels of analyst following (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996; Hong et al. 
2000; Gleason and Lee 2003).  
In this regard, prior literature suggests that the impact of the disposition 
effect is likely to be even greater among firms with weaker information 
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environments and greater valuation uncertainty. Specifically, using individual 
account data from a discount brokerage, Kumar (2009) finds that the disposition 
effect is stronger for firms with greater valuation uncertainty, consistent with the 
notion from behavioral psychology that decision-makers are generally more likely 
to resort to behavioral biases and heuristics when faced with solving more 
difficult problems. Kumar (2009) states that he does not control for analyst 
forecast dispersion in his study because a large number of firms with high 
valuation uncertainty do not have analyst coverage and would be excluded from 
the analysis if coverage were required. Extending Kumar’s (2009) research to my 
setting enhances the contribution of my study and also allows me to confirm that 
the results documented in the previous chapters of the paper provide a reasonable 
(if not conservative) estimate of the impact of the disposition effect on the market 
reaction to earnings announcements for firms not included in my primary sample.  
Accordingly, I analyze whether my results vary with the strength of the 
firm’s information environment by allowing the coefficients in equation (3) to 
vary with the level of analyst following. Similar to the analysis of the December 
effect presented in Table 5, I relax the analyst following sample selection 
requirement and replace ABS_UE with ABS_SUE, allowing me to include firms 
with no or low analyst following in the analysis. This provides a sample of 89,596 
observations with available data, which is the same sample examined in Table 5, 
and is identified in the sample selection diagram in Table 1 as the “Analyst 
Following Robustness Sample.”  
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[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the analysis. Column 1 presents the results 
of estimating the revised equation (3) on the full analyst following robustness 
sample, while columns 2 – 4 present the results of the estimation for subsamples 
of firms with no, low (1-5 analysts), and high (more than 5 analysts) analyst 
following, respectively.  The coefficient on CGO_DUMMY remains positive and 
significant (p < 0.01) in all specifications. Consistent with a stronger disposition 
effect among firms with weaker information environments, the coefficient on 
CGO_DUMMY decreases monotonically as analyst coverage increases, varying 
from 0.183 for firms with no analyst following to 0.064 for firms with high 
analyst following. Untabulated analysis from fully-interacted models on the 
pooled sample confirm that the coefficients on CGO_DUMMY for each analyst 
following subsample are significantly (p < 0.01) different from one another. 
Consistent with the sample selection requirements for the primary sample, the 
primary sample coefficient of 0.068 on CGO_DUMMY from Table 3 is similar to 
that of the high analyst following subsample. The larger coefficients on 
CGO_DUMMY among subsamples with less analyst following, as well as the 
larger coefficient of 0.109 for the full sample of 89,596 observations presented in 
column 1, suggest that the main results in the paper are likely to generalize to, and 
may even be stronger in, a broader cross-section of firms with more variation in 
information environment.  
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Another key aspect of my research design is the measurement of my 
variables of interest.  As discussed earlier in the text, I repeat all of my analysis 
using an alternate, more conventional, turnover-based measure of abnormal 
trading volume to ensure that my findings are not sensitive to my choice of a 
transaction-based measure of abnormal volume. Likewise, in this chapter I test 
whether my findings are sensitive to my use of CGO
 
as a proxy for the 
representative investor’s unrealized capital gain/loss position in any given stock. 
While I believe that CGO is a reliable proxy, shown to be robust to a number of 
validation tests performed by Frazzini (2006), there are two possible sources of 
measurement error in CGO that could affect my results.  First, the computation of 
CGO assumes that the available holdings data of 13-F filing institutions is 
representative of the aggregate purchasing patterns of all shareholders in a stock. 
This may not be true for firms with low levels of institutional ownership. Second, 
13-F holdings data is reported only once each calendar quarter, which may lead to 
stale reference price data for earnings announcements that occur more than a 
month after the most recent 13-F reporting date. To ensure that my findings are 
not sensitive to these potential measurement errors, I repeat my analysis using an 
alternate proxy for stockholders’ aggregate reference price.  
I calculate this alternate reference price using each stock’s historical series 
of prices and turnover, following the methodology developed by Grinblatt and 
Han (2005). Intuitively, the measure is based on the assumption that, “If a stock 
had high turnover a year ago, but volume has been very low ever since, then most 
of the current holders probably bought the stock a year ago, so we can use the past 
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year’s price as a proxy for the purchase price. Similarly, if a stock had high 
turnover in the past month, most investors probably bought it recently, so we can 
use last month’s average or closing price as a proxy for the purchase price”  
(Frazzini 2006, p. 2042).  
Formally, the reference price is calculated using the following two-stage 
process. First, I calculate , , the percentage of outstanding shares purchased 
at date t-n that are still held by their original purchasers on date t, as 
 
( )1
,
1
1
n
t t n t n t nV TO TO τ
τ
−
− − − +
=
 
= − 
 
∏%
                                   (7) 
where TOt is turnover in month t. The reference price is then estimated as 
 
1
,
0
t
t t t n t n
n
RP V Pφ −
− −
=
= ∑ %
                                               (8) 
where  φ is a normalizing constant such that 
,0
t
t t nn
Vφ
−
=
=∑ % , and Pt is the stock 
price at the end of month t. Following Grinblatt and Han (2005), I truncate the 
estimation period to include the prior five years of data and normalize the 
monthly trading probabilities so that they sum to one.10   
 Given this alternate reference price, I compute an alternate measure of the 
capital gains overhang (CGO_ALT) in the same manner defined previously in 
equation (2).  The computation of CGO_ALT incorporates the trading history of 
all shareholders in a given stock, does not require the availability of 13-F filing 
data, and is updated monthly to provide a more timely proxy. While CGO_ALT 
                                                 
10
 Grinblatt and Han (2005) note that distant market prices likely have little influence on the 
reference price, and report that their results were robust to alternately using three or seven years of 
prior data to estimate the reference price.  
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addresses the potential measurement error concerns of CGO, it suffers from other 
limitations which justify its use as an alternate, instead of primary, proxy for the 
capital gains overhang in my study. Namely, CGO_ALT does not incorporate 
directly observed holdings data for any of the firm’s shareholders, instead relying 
on assumed trading patterns implied from aggregate trading volume. This 
assumption will generate greater measurement error in CGO_ALT whenever 
investors exhibit heterogeneous purchasing patterns (Frazzini 2006). Further, in 
untabulated analysis, I find that CGO_ALT is more highly correlated with 
MOMENTUM and AVG_TURN than CGO, making it more difficult to determine 
whether that results based on CGO_ALT are caused by disposition effect behavior 
as opposed to firm-level microstructure or liquidity concerns.  
 Since CGO and CGO_ALT each suffer from different potential limitations 
and sources of measurement error, examining the robustness of my results using 
both proxies increases the probability that my findings are driven by investors’ 
aggregate capital gains position instead of a spurious aspect of either proxy.11 
Another advantage of incorporating CGO_ALT in my analysis is that it allows me 
to examine the sensitivity of my results to varying levels of institutional 
ownership.  Unsurprisingly, prior literature examining demographic data for 
individual accounts at a major discount brokerage finds that the disposition effect 
is more pronounced for less sophisticated investors (Dhar and Zhu 2006). Thus, 
my results may be stronger among firms with greater proportions of individual 
                                                 
11
 The pearson correlation between CGO and CGO_ALT is 0.67 (p < 0.01), consistent with both 
proxies measuring the same underlying construct while being subject to independent sources of 
variation.   
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ownership relative to those with ownership concentrated among sophisticated 
institutional investors. 
 Accordingly, I analyze whether my results are sensitive to the use of 
CGO_ALT, as well the sensitivity of my results to the firm’s level of institutional 
ownership, by re-estimating equation (3) using CGO_ALT, and allowing the 
coefficients to vary with the firm’s level of institutional ownership. For 
comparability with the mean results in the paper, I again employ a binary measure 
of investors’ unrealized gain/loss position, CGO_DUMMY_ALTit, which is equal 
to 1 when CGO_ALTit > 0 and zero otherwise. To allow the inclusion of firms 
with low levels of institutional ownership in the analysis, I again relax the analyst 
following sample selection requirement and replace ABS_UE with ABS_SUE. I 
also relax the sample selection requirements with respect to 13-F holdings data, 
which results in a robustness sample of 105,308 observations. This sample is 
identified in the sample selection diagram in Table 1 as the “13-F Robustness 
Sample.”  
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
Table 9 presents the results of the analysis. Column 1 presents the results 
of estimating the revised equation (3) on the full 13-F robustness sample, while 
columns 2 – 4 present the results of the estimation for subsamples of firms with 
low ( < 20%), medium (20 – 60%), and high (> 60%) institutional ownership, 
respectively.  The coefficient on CGO_DUMMY_ALT is positive and significant 
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(p < 0.01) in all specifications. Consistent with a stronger disposition effect 
among less sophisticated investors, the coefficient on CGO_DUMMY_ALT 
decreases monotonically as institutional ownership increases, varying from 0.153 
for firms with low institutional ownership to 0.060 for firms with high 
institutional ownership. Untabulated analysis from fully-interacted models on the 
pooled sample confirm that the coefficients on CGO_DUMMY_ALT for each 
institutional ownership subsample are significantly (p < 0.01) different from one 
another. The positive coefficient of 0.099 for the full sample of 105,308 
observations presented in column 1 suggests that my findings are robust to the 
alternate capital gains overhang measure. To confirm this, I repeat all of the 
analysis (untabulated) from Tables 2 – 7 changing only the definition of the 
capital gains overhang measure and find that all inferences remain unchanged.  
Taken together, the robustness tests performed in this chapter confirm that 
my findings are robust to alternate sample selection requirements and variable 
definitions. The results of the sensitivity analysis also provide additional evidence 
in support of the behavioral theories motivating the study by demonstrating that 
my results are stronger among firms with weaker information environments and 
less sophisticated investors.   
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents robust evidence that the disposition effect documented 
in the behavioral finance literature can be observed in the aggregate trading 
response to the release of earnings information, even after controlling for 
information-related determinants of the trade around earnings announcements. In 
addition to finding evidence of a positive relation between investors’ unrealized 
capital gains and aggregate abnormal trading volume around earnings 
announcements, I also find that this relation is stronger among seller-initiated 
trades than buyer-initiated trades and exhibits a seasonal December effect. In 
sensitivity analysis, I also find that this relation is stronger among less 
sophisticated investors and for firms with weaker information environments, 
consistent with the behavioral explanation. 
Furthermore, I show that this aggregate disposition effect moderates the 
impact of information-related determinants of abnormal announcement-window 
trading volume and affects announcement-window abnormal returns. These 
results motivate future research on the degree to which investors’ cognitive biases 
affect their response to earnings information.  My results should also be of interest 
to researchers who treat abnormal trading volume as a proxy for investor 
disagreement (e.g. Garfinkel 2009; Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006), as I show that 
both the level of abnormal trading volume and the degree to which abnormal 
trading volume reflects disagreement are affected by stockholders’ capital gains 
overhang.  
46 
In the context of the drift found by Frazzini (2006), my results suggest that 
a wealth transfer may take place around earnings announcements, from investors 
more prone to the disposition effect to those less prone to the disposition effect, as 
well as from investors prone to the disposition effect to the government in the 
form of higher capital gains tax payments. However, beyond presenting evidence 
of systematically predictable announcement-window abnormal returns, I do not 
directly examine the welfare implications of the disposition effect on investors’ 
earnings-related trading decisions. Future archival or experimental research may 
wish to further examine the welfare implications of this behavior. 
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APPENDIX A  
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
  
52 
AVOLj  Number of firm  trades by investor group  during 
three-day earnings announcement interval ln( )
Median number of firm  trades by investor group  
during three-day non-announcement intervals
i j
t
i j
 
 
Where the three-day earnings announcement interval is 
measured from days          [-1,+1] relative to Compustat 
quarterly earnings announcement date t , and the non-
announcement period includes all contiguous three-day 
periods from trading days [-250, -2] relative to the earnings 
announcement date, excluding any three-day periods 
containing previous earnings announcements. Investor 
groups j are defined as: 
 
TOTAL TRADES = All trades within TAQ sample selection 
requirements 
BUYER-INIT TRADES = Buyer-Initiated Trades, classified 
using the Lee-Ready (1991) algorithm 
SELLER-INIT TRADES= Seller-Initiated Trades, classified 
using the Lee-Ready (1991) algorithm 
 
I also examine an alternate definition of AVOLj defined as 
 
AVOLSHARE TURNOVER= 
Cumulative three-day share turnover during 
earnings announcement interval ln( )
Median cumulative three-day share turnover 
during non-announcement intervals
t
 
 
Where share turnover is defined as volume divided by 
shares outstanding from the CRSP daily stock file, and 
announcement periods remain the same.  
   
CGO  Capital Gains Overhang, defined as the percentage deviation 
of the aggregate reference price from the current end-of-
month price (Pt - RPt)/Pt. The reference price is defined as 
1
,
0
t
t t t n t n
n
RP V Pφ −
− −
=
= ∑ , where ,t t nV −   is the number of shares 
purchased by observable 13-F institutions at date t-n that are 
still held by the original purchasers at date t, φ is a 
normalizing constant such that ,0
t
t t nn
Vφ
−
=
=∑
, and Pt is the 
stock price at the end of month t. 
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CGO_ALT  Capital Gains Overhang, defined as the percentage deviation 
of the aggregate reference price from the current end-of-
month price (Pt - RPt)/Pt. The reference price is defined as 
1
,
0
t
t t t n t n
n
RP V Pφ −
− −
=
= ∑ % , where ( )
1
,
1
1
n
t t n t n t nV TO TO τ
τ
−
− − − +
=
 
= − 
 
∏%  
and TOt is turnover, defined as monthly volume divided by 
shares outstanding for month t. φ is a normalizing constant 
such that 
,0
t
t t nn
Vφ
−
=
=∑ % , and Pt is the stock price at the end 
of month t. 
   
CGO_DUM
MY 
 A binary variable equal to 1 when CGO > 0, and zero 
otherwise. 
   
ABS_UE 
 
100* (The absolute value of I/B/E/S actual EPS for quarter t 
minus the most recent mean I/B/E/S consensus quarter t EPS 
forecast prior to the earnings announcement, scaled by 
beginning of quarter t stock price in Compustat). 
 
 
 
SIZE 
 
The natural log of  market value of equity at the beginning 
of quarter t. 
  DISPERSIO
N 
The natural log of preannouncement dispersion, measured as 
the standard deviation of the most recent I/B/E/S consensus 
EPS forecast for quarter t prior to the earnings 
announcement scaled by beginning of quarter t stock price 
in Compustat. 
  ABS_RETU
RN 
Absolute value of the cumulative return over the three-day 
window centered on the earnings announcement. 
 
  
MKT_TURN 
 
The natural log of the percentage of all NYSE/AMEX firms’ 
outstanding shares that are traded over the three-day event 
window. 
 
  
PRICE 
 
The natural log of closing price  at the beginning of quarter 
t. 
 
  
AVG_TURN  Average monthly share turnover for the prior twelve months 
  MOM The 11-month buy-and-hold return on firm i beginning 12 
months prior to the month of the earnings announcement 
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DECEMBE
R   
equals 1 if the earnings announcement date occurs during 
December, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
 ABS_SUE  abs(EARNINGSt – EARNINGSt-4) scaled by the standard 
deviation of EARNINGS over the previous twenty quarters 
(minimum of eight quarters of data required) , where 
EARNINGS is defined as income before extraordinary items 
scaled by beginning of quarter total assets. 
 
  
CAR(-1,+1) 
 
Three-day cumulative abnormal return  around earnings 
announcement date t, relative to the Fama-French-
momentum four-factor benchmark return (Carhart 1997) 
 
  
UE 
 
100* (I/B/E/S actual EPS for quarter t minus the most recent 
mean I/B/E/S consensus quarter t EPS forecast prior to the 
earnings announcement, scaled by beginning of quarter t 
stock price in Compustat). 
 
  
NONLINEA
R  
UE*abs(UE) 
 
  
LOSS 
 
Equals 1 if reported earnings before extraordinary items are 
negative, and 0 otherwise. 
 
  
ROA 
 
Income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning of 
quarter total assets. 
55 
APPENDIX B  
FIGURES AND TABLES 
  
56 
Figure 1: Annual Differences in Mean Abnormal Announcement-Window 
Volume when Stockholders are in a Gain vs Loss Position at the time of the 
Earnings Announcement 
 
This figure depicts annual differences in mean abnormal announcement-window trading volume 
between earnings announcements where stockholders are in an aggregate unrealized gain versus 
aggregate unrealized loss position at the time of the announcement (gain – loss). Unrealized gain 
observations are observations where capital gains overhang is greater than zero (CGO > 0) and 
unrealized loss observations are observations where the capital gains overhang is less than or equal 
to zero (CGO < =0). Differences in means are displayed for two different measures of abnormal 
trading volume (AVOL). The solid bar depicts differences in exp(AVOLTOTAL TRADES), while the 
striped bar depicts differences in exp(AVOLSELLER-INIT TRADES). CGO, AVOLTOTAL TRADES, and 
AVOLSELLER-INIT TRADES are defined in Appendix A. All annual volume differences are statistically 
significnat at the 1% level based on (two-tailed) Satterthwaite t-statistics for groups with unequal 
variance.
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Figure 2: Average Three-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around 
Earnings Announcements Based on Stockholders’ Unrealized Gain/Loss 
Position 
 
 
This figure depicts mean three-day cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements 
separately for observations where stockholders are in an aggregate unrealized gain versus 
aggregate unrealized loss position at the time of the announcement. Unrealized gain observations 
are observations where capital gains overhang is greater than zero (CGO > 0) and unrealized loss 
observations are observations where the capital gains overhang is less than or equal to zero (CGO 
< =0). Three-day cumulative abnormal returns centered on the earnings announcement date (CAR(-
1,+1)) are calculated relative to benchmark returns from the Fama-French-Momentum four-factor 
model (Carhart 1997).Average three-day cumulative abnormal returns are presented for each 
decile of unexpected earnings (UE). The solid (striped) bar depicts average three day cumulative 
abnormal returns for earnings announcements where stockholders are in an unrealized loss (gain) 
position. CGO, CAR(-1,+1), and UE are formally defined in Appendix A. Stars indicate statistically 
significant differences in mean cumulative abnormal returns between the unrealized gain and loss 
sample for each decile of unexpected earnings. *,**,***, indicate (two-tailed) significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively based on Satterthwaite t-statistics for groups with unequal 
variances. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Firm- 
Quarter 
Observations 
Unique 
Firms 
Compustat observations 1994 - 2007 with all 
necessary data items available 
 342,209  14,530 
     Retain NYSE-AMEX Firms with necessary 
return data available from CRSP 
 118,158  4,464 
     Retain firms with sufficient CRSP price and 
volume history to compute volume-based 
capital gains overhang measure 
 116,491  4,384 
     (13-F Robustness Sample) Retain firms with 
available TAQ data to calculate abnormal 
trading volume measures 
 105,308  4,223 
     (Analyst Following Robustness Sample) 
Retain firms with available Thompson 
Reuters 13-F data to calculate holdings-based 
capital gains overhang measure 
 89,596  3,524 
     Firms with available I/B/E/S summary file 
quarterly earnings estimates for the month 
prior to the earnings announcement 
 70,245  2,927 
     (Primary Sample) Retain firms with at least 
three analyst estimates included in the 
I/B/E/S summary file quarterly earnings 
estimates for the month prior to the earnings 
announcement 
 55,245  2,430 
This table illustrates the sample selection procedure. Appendix A specifies the required data items 
for each variable included in the analysis. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Statistic 
Full 
Sample 
(N=55,245) 
Unrealized 
Loss Sample 
(N=15,830) 
Unrealized 
Gain 
Sample 
(N=39,415) 
AVOLTOTAL 
TRADES 
 Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
  0.448 
 0.410 
 0.445 
  0.367 
 0.329 
 0.459 
  0.480 
 0.439 
 0.435 
AVOLSHARE 
TURNOVER 
Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 0.478 
 0.448 
 0.581 
  0.455 
 0.421 
 0.621 
  0.487 
 0.457 
 0.564 
AVOLBUYER-
INITIATED TRADES 
Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 0.458 
 0.434 
 0.479 
  0.379 
 0.359 
 0.501 
  0.489 
 0.462 
 0.466 
AVOLSELLER-
INITIATED TRADES 
Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 0.440 
 0.404 
 0.464 
  0.353 
 0.318 
 0.476 
  0.475 
 0.436 
 0.454 
CGO Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 0.028 
 0.142 
 0.589 
 -0.474 
-0.202 
 0.901 
  0.230 
 0.216 
 0.137 
ABS_UE Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 0.346 
 0.081 
 1.207 
  0.765 
 0.179 
 2.020 
  0.178 
 0.061 
 0.554 
SIZE Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 7.697 
 7.597 
 1.477 
  7.118 
 6.985 
 1.499 
  7.929 
 7.826 
 1.402 
DISPERSION Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
-7.177 
-7.255 
 1.181 
 -6.510 
-6.579 
 1.283 
 -7.445 
-7.477 
 1.021 
ABS_RET Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 0.046 
 0.031 
 0.047 
  0.057 
 0.039 
 0.058 
  0.041 
 0.029 
 0.041 
MKT_TURN Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
-3.973 
-3.908 
 0.323 
 -3.962 
-3.899 
 0.301 
 -3.977 
-3.919 
 0.331 
PRICE Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 3.336 
 3.399 
 0.666 
  2.839 
 2.907 
 0.697 
  3.536 
 3.559 
 0.535 
AVG_TURN Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 6.800 
 6.821 
 1.642 
  6.651 
 6.640 
 1.616 
  6.860 
 6.901 
 1.649 
60 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Statistic 
Full 
Sample 
(N=55,245) 
Unrealized 
Loss Sample 
(N=15,830) 
Unrealized 
Gain 
Sample 
(N=39,415) 
MOM Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
 0.149 
 0.112 
 0.390 
 -0.134 
-0.159 
 0.326 
  0.263 
 0.196 
 0.354 
(Continued from Table 2) This table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample, unrealized 
gain, and unrealized loss samples. Unrealized gain observations are observations where capital 
gains overhang is greater than zero (CGO > 0) and unrealized loss observations are observations 
where the capital gains overhang is less than or equal to zero (CGO < =0). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. All variable means are significantly different between the unrealized gain 
and unrealized loss samples at the 1% level based on (two-tailed) Satterthwaite t-statistics for 
groups with unequal variances. 
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Table 4 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates (t-statistics) for Tests of the 
Impact of Capital Gains Overhang on Abnormal Trading Volume Around Quarterly 
Earnings Announcements from 1994 to 2007 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
_ _ _
_ _
ijt it it it it it
it it it it it
AVOL CGO DUMMY ABS UE SIZE DISPERSION ABS RETURN
MKT TURN PRICE AVG TURN MOMENTUM
α α α α α α
α α α α ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
      (3) 
         
 Measure of AVOLijt 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 
Pred. 
Sign 
TOTAL 
TRADES  
SHARE 
TURNOVER  
BUYER- 
INITIATED 
TRADES  
SELLER- 
INITIATED 
TRADES 
 
Constant  1.296 *** 0.716 ** 1.350 *** 1.350 *** 
  (3.52)  (2.57)  (4.27)  (3.25)  
CGO_DUMMY (+) 0.068 *** 0.052 *** 0.058 *** 0.074 *** 
  (4.12)  (3.83)  (3.26)  (4.78)  
ABS_UE (+) 0.008 *** 0.013 *** 0.005 ** 0.012 *** 
  (4.39)  (5.81)  (2.43)  (5.13)  
SIZE (-) 
-0.048 *** -0.051 *** -0.039 *** -0.051 *** 
  (-5.12)  (-6.22)  (-4.10)  (-5.50)  
DISPERSION (+) 
-0.006  -0.014 *** -0.006  -0.005  
  (-1.24)  (-2.60)  (-1.35)  (-1.03)  
ABS_RETURN (+) 3.787 *** 5.215 *** 3.948 *** 3.627 *** 
  (12.69)  (18.90)  (11.94)  (13.98)  
MKT_TURN (+) 0.313 *** 0.191 *** 0.322 *** 0.338 *** 
  (3.49)  (2.97)  (4.10)  (3.39)  
PRICE (+) 0.098 *** 0.090 *** 0.094 *** 0.100 *** 
  (7.18)  (8.17)  (7.20)  (6.91)  
AVG_TURN (+) 0.022  0.032 *** 0.011  0.030 ** 
  (1.64)  (2.72)  (0.80)  (2.15)  
MOMENTUM (+) 0.197 *** 0.083 *** 0.210 *** 0.199 *** 
  (8.25)  (4.78)  (7.58)  (8.82)  
Observations 55,245  55,245  55,245  55,245  
Adjusted R2 31.2%  24.3%  29.2%  32.9%  
 
This table reports various specifications of the OLS regression outlined in equation (4). T-statistics 
reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and year. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. *,**,***, indicate (two-tailed) significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates (t-statistics) for Tests of a 
December Effect on the Impact of the Capital Gains Overhang on Abnormal Trading 
Volume Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements from 1994 to 2007 
_ 0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
* _
_ _ _
TOTAL TRADES it it it it it it
it it it it it
it
AVOL CGO DECEMBER CGO DECEMBER ABS SUE SIZE
ABS RETURN MKT TURN PRICE AVG TURN MOMENTUM
α α α α α α
α α α α α
ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + +
+    
(4) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 
Pred. 
Sign 
All 
Obs. 
 Unrealized 
Gains 
(CGO > 0) 
 Unrealized 
Losses 
(CGO < 0) 
 
Constant  1.513 *** 1.622 *** 1.318 *** 
  (4.97)  (5.06)  (4.01)  
CGO (+) 0.069 *** 0.349 *** 0.039 *** 
  (7.27)  (11.30)  (5.16)  
DECEMBER  0.063 * 0.064 * 0.146 *** 
  (1.76)  (1.74)  (3.53)  
CGO*DECEMBER (-) -0.079 *** -0.275 *** -0.046 *** 
  (-4.87)  (-2.72)  (-3.46)  
ABS_SUE (+) 0.011 *** 0.015 *** 0.007  
  (2.84)  (3.82)  (1.54)  
SIZE (-) -0.035 *** -0.039 *** -0.015  
  (-3.48)  (-3.53)  (-1.14)  
ABS_RETURN (+) 4.310 *** 4.857 *** 3.908 *** 
  (17.25)  (16.23)  (20.00)  
MKT_TURN (+) 0.311 *** 0.316 *** 0.273 *** 
  (4.01)  (3.94)  (3.34)  
PRICE (+) 0.055 *** 0.001  0.057 *** 
  (4.22)  (0.04)  (3.48)  
AVG_TURN (+) 0.000  0.012  -0.019  
  (0.01)  (0.95)  (-1.11)  
MOMENTUM (+) 0.235 *** 0.154 *** 0.206 *** 
  (11.29)  (6.14)  (10.58)  
Observations 89,596  56,902  32,682  
Adjusted R2 26.5%  30.6%  21.4%  
F-Statistic, test of (α1+ α3) = 0 0.317  0.464  0.235  
 
This table reports various specifications of the OLS regression outlined in equation (5). T-statistics 
reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and year. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. *,**,***, indicate (two-tailed) significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 6 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates (t-statistics) for Tests of the 
Impact of Capital Gains Overhang on the Relation Between Earnings Information and 
Abnormal Trading Volume Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements from 1994 to 2007 
_ 0 1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
10 11 12
_ _ _ * _
_ *
_ * _ _
_
TOTAL TRADES it it it it
it it it it
it it it it
it it
AVOL CGO DUMMY ABS UE CGO DUMMY ABS UE
SIZE CGO DUMMY SIZE DISPERSION
CGO DUMMY DISPERSION ABS RETURN MKT TURN
PRICE AVG TURN MOME
α α α α
α α α
α α α
α α α
= + + +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + + it itNTUM ε+                    
(5) 
 Pred. 
Sign 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Constant  1.284 *** 1.201 *** 1.249 *** 1.207 *** 
  (3.49)  (3.13)  (3.39)  (3.17)  
CGO_DUMMY (+) 0.060 *** 0.218 *** 0.136 *** 0.186 *** 
  (3.66)  (3.46)  (3.47)  (2.95)  
ABS_UE (+) 0.004 ** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.006 *** 
  (2.54)  (4.97)  (4.51)  (2.65)  
CGO_DUMMY*ABS_UE (+) 0.026 ***     0.023 *** 
  (3.66)      (3.31)  
SIZE (-) -0.048 *** -0.034 *** -0.048 *** -0.035 *** 
  (-5.08)  (-3.68)  (-5.08)  (-3.78)  
CGO_DUMMY*SIZE (-)   -0.020 **   -0.019 ** 
   
 (-2.56)    (-2.20)  
DISPERSION (+) -0.007 * -0.005  -0.012 ** -0.006  
  (-1.76)  (-1.21)  (-2.50)  (-1.12)  
CGO_DUMMY*DISPERSION (+)     0.010 * -0.002  
   
 
 
 (1.71)  (-0.33)  
ABS_RETURN (+) 3.786 *** 3.785 *** 3.788 *** 3.784 *** 
  (12.70)  (12.58)  (12.71)  (12.59)  
MKT_TURN (+) 0.313 *** 0.314 *** 0.312 *** 0.313 *** 
  (3.48)  (3.48)  (3.48)  (3.48)  
PRICE (+) 0.097 *** 0.096 *** 0.097 *** 0.096 *** 
  (7.22)  (7.21)  (7.18)  (7.26)  
AVG_TURN (+) 0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022  
  (1.64)  (1.63)  (1.64)  (1.63)  
MOMENTUM (+) 0.195 *** 0.194 *** 0.197 *** 0.193 *** 
  (8.22)  (8.00)  (8.23)  (7.99)  
Observations 55,245  55,245  55,245  55,245  
Adjusted R2 31.3%  31.2%  31.3%  31.2%  
 
This table reports various specifications of the OLS regression outlined in equation (6). T-statistics 
reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and year. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. *,**,***, indicate (two-tailed) significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates (t-statistics) for Tests of the 
Impact of Capital Gains Overhang on Abnormal Returns Around Quarterly Earnings 
Announcements from 1994 to 2007 
            
( 1, 1) 0 1 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
_
_
it it it it it
it it it it
CAR CGO DUMMY UE NONLINEAR LOSS ROA
DISPERSION PRICE AVG TURN
β β β β β β
β β β ε
− + = + + + + +
+ + + +
                     (6) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Pred. 
Sign 
All 
Obs. 
 Good News 
(UE  > 0) 
 Bad News 
(UE < 0) 
 
Constant  0.007 ** -0.020 *** 0.025 *** 
  (2.04)  (-3.12)  (5.28)  
CGO_DUMMY (-) -0.007 *** -0.012 *** -0.005 ** 
 
 (-5.07)  (-8.86)  (-2.19)  
UE (+) 0.023 *** 0.047 *** 0.010 *** 
 
 (11.44)  (7.53)  (6.91)  
NONLINEAR (-) -0.002 *** -0.013 *** -0.001 *** 
 
 (-9.01)  (-6.96)  (-5.33)  
LOSS (-) -0.004 ** -0.006 *** -0.004 ** 
 
 (-2.33)  (-2.84)  (-2.21)  
DISPERSION (-) -0.000  -0.006 *** 0.004 *** 
 
 (-0.71)  (-7.15)  (6.51)  
ROA (+) 0.067 *** 0.053 * 0.006  
 
 (3.25)  (1.94)  (0.17)  
PRICE (-) -0.001  -0.003 *** 0.004 *** 
 
 (-0.68)  (-3.09)  (2.98)  
AVG_TURN (-) -0.000  0.001  -0.002 *** 
  (-0.39)  (1.63)  (-4.90)  
Observations 55,245  29,838  18,364  
Adjusted R2 3.1%  2.5%  1.1%  
 
This table reports various specifications of the OLS regression outlined in equation (7). T-statistics 
reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by firm and year. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. *,**,***, indicate (two-tailed) significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 8 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates (t-statistics) for Tests of the 
Impact of Capital Gains Overhang on Abnormal Trading Volume Around Quarterly 
Earnings Announcements from 1994 to 2007, by Level of Analyst Following 
_ 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
_ _ _
_ _
TOTAL TRADES it it it it
it it it it it
AVOL CGO DUMMY ABS SUE SIZE ABS RETURN
MKT TURN PRICE AVG TURN MOMENTUM
α α α α α
α α α α ε
= + + + +
+ + + + +
 
         
 Level of Analyst Following 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Full 
Sample  
No Analyst 
Following  
1-5 
Analysts 
Following  
>5 
Analysts 
Following 
 
Constant  1.413 *** 1.453 *** 1.422 *** 1.338 *** 
  (4.62)  (4.98)  (4.44)  (3.26)  
CGO_DUMMY (+) 0.109 *** 0.183 *** 0.103 *** 0.064 *** 
  (6.20)  (7.03)  (5.26)  (4.06)  
ABS_SUE (+) 0.010 *** 0.013 ** 0.008  0.010 *** 
  (2.59)  (2.44)  (1.47)  (3.03)  
SIZE (-) -0.038 *** -0.038 *** -0.049 *** -0.053 *** 
  (-3.88)  (-4.12)  (-5.90)  (-4.66)  
ABS_RETURN (+) 4.267 *** 4.804 *** 4.346 *** 3.608 *** 
  (16.86)  (26.10)  (17.19)  (11.21)  
MKT_TURN (+) 0.308 *** 0.263 *** 0.303 *** 0.312 *** 
  (3.97)  (3.63)  (3.90)  (3.14)  
PRICE (+) 0.066 *** 0.046 *** 0.073 *** 0.101 *** 
  (4.87)  (2.79)  (6.67)  (6.58)  
AVG_TURN (+) 0.001  -0.065 *** -0.001  0.026 * 
  (0.08)  (-6.62)  (-0.07)  (1.76)  
MOMENTUM (+) 0.231 *** 0.269 *** 0.257 *** 0.174 *** 
  (10.80)  (9.68)  (18.95)  (5.81)  
Observations 89,596  19,289  32,726  37,581  
Adjusted R2 26.2%  24.8%  27.8%  31.7%  
 
This table reports the results of the estimating the OLS regression defined at the top of the table over various 
subsamples of analyst following. Analyst following is defined as the number of analyst estimates included in the 
month t-1 I/B/E/S summary file consensus earnings forecast for quarterly earnings announcement t (I/B/E/S data item 
NUMEST). T-statistics reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, clustered by 
firm and year. All variables are defined in Appendix A. *,**,***, indicate (two-tailed) significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 9 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates (t-statistics) for Tests of the 
Impact of Capital Gains Overhang on Abnormal Trading Volume Around Quarterly 
Earnings Announcements from 1994 to 2007, by Level of Institutional Ownership 
_ 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
_ _ _ _
_ _
TOTAL TRADES it it it it
it it it it it
AVOL CGO DUMMY ALT ABS SUE SIZE ABS RETURN
MKT TURN PRICE AVG TURN MOMENTUM
α α α α α
α α α α ε
= + + + +
+ + + + +
 
         
 Level of Institutional Ownership 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Full 
Sample  
< 20% 
Institutional 
Ownership  
20 - 60% 
Institutional 
Ownership  
> 60% 
Institutional 
Ownership 
 
Constant  1.456 *** 1.671 *** 1.224 *** 1.328 *** 
  (4.52)  (5.60)  (4.21)  (3.09)  
CGO_DUMMY_ALT (+) 0.099 *** 0.153 *** 0.102 *** 0.060 *** 
  (5.91)  (6.50)  (5.77)  (3.78)  
ABS_SUE (+) 0.009 *** 0.006  0.012 *** 0.009 ** 
  (2.58)  (1.55)  (2.67)  (2.25)  
SIZE (-) -0.026 *** 0.002  -0.015  -0.050 *** 
  (-2.73)  (0.23)  (-1.45)  (-4.15)  
ABS_RETURN (+) 4.394 *** 4.833 *** 4.647 *** 3.639 *** 
  (17.34)  (20.60)  (16.04)  (13.90)  
MKT_TURN (+) 0.328 *** 0.370 *** 0.263 *** 0.316 *** 
  (4.06)  (4.95)  (3.65)  (2.90)  
PRICE (+) 0.066 *** 0.034 ** 0.053 *** 0.099 *** 
  (4.62)  (2.07)  (3.78)  (6.86)  
AVG_TURN (+) -0.007  -0.048 *** -0.024 ** 0.028 ** 
  (-0.54)  (-4.14)  (-2.11)  (2.00)  
MOMENTUM (+) 0.226 *** 0.247 *** 0.237 *** 0.192 *** 
  (11.21)  (9.23)  (14.76)  (7.54)  
Observations 105,308  29,730  35,997  39,581  
Adjusted R2 25.8%  24.0%  25.2%  31.1%  
 
This table reports the results of the estimating the OLS regression defined at the top of the table over various 
subsamples of institutional ownership levels. Institutional ownership is defined as the percentage of outstanding 
shares held by observable 13-F filing institutions as of the end of the most recent calendar quarter prior to the earnings 
announcement date. T-statistics reported in parenthesis are calculated using two-way clustered standard errors, 
clustered by firm and year. All variables are defined in Appendix A. *,**,***, indicate (two-tailed) significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
